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The legitimising power of regulation for Australian banks: 
an institutional approach 
 
 
Abstract 
The history of the Australian banking system has been one of a striving for 
legitimacy, against a cycle of boom, bust and public antagonism. Despite a series of 
banking inquiries and ensuing regulatory reform, banks continue to announce 
unexpected results. Over the past 15 years, each of the four major Australian banks, 
while complying with the increasingly stringent requirements of regulatory bodies, 
reported at least one major financial blunder. An institutional perspective 
demonstrates that rules and regulations play a powerful legitimising role in assisting 
banks to maintain their public image in the face of such disasters.  
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1. Introduction 
Against a history of boom and bust, and resulting “public antagonism” (Crane, et al., 
2001, p. 64), the Australian banking industry has struggled to create and maintain an 
image of legitimacy and success. Not one of Australia’s four biggest banks has been 
immune from financial controversy in the last fifteen years. In this period there have 
been announcements of unexpected losses or disasters by each of Australia’s four 
major banks, Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation Ltd (ANZ), 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia Banking Corporation 
(NAB) and Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC), culminating in the NAB’s 
unexpected announcement in January 2004, that it had incurred hundreds of millions 
of dollars in foreign currency trading losses. These surprise announcements have been 
made despite a history of government enquiries and the development of more 
stringent regulatory systems since the deregulation of the Australian banking system 
in 1979.  
Such events illustrate the banks’ propensity to experience crises, undergo 
investigations, and re-form their corporate image before another crisis eventuates. 
They also raise questions about the purpose of regulation, disclosure, corporate 
governance and the financial reporting practices of Australia’s major banks. Because 
banking is a significant, competitive, high-profile industry, its major players must 
maintain their credibility in the marketplace in spite of occasional revelations of 
unethical or illegal practices and a lack of accountability. This paper asserts that 
institutionalised regulatory systems have a legitimising effect on Australian banks, 
assisting them to promote an image of strength and success in spite of recurrent 
failures.  
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The paper first provides an overview of some unexpected announcements made by the 
four major Australian banks since 1992, and then provides a framework for the 
interpretation of these events, based on institutional theory. It next provides a brief  
history of Australian banking enquiries and an overview of corporate regulatory 
structures, including the recent introduction of Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
corporate governance rules. Following this, the banks’ responses to their respective 
crises and new regulatory requirements are explored. Conclusions are then drawn 
about the role and significance for banks, of Australia’s regulatory framework, and 
possibilities for future research are outlined.  
2. Unexpected announcements 
In the twelve years immediately preceding NAB’s shock announcement of January 
2004, each of the four major Australian banks announced unexpected losses or 
expenses. Table 1 below highlights selected examples.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The unexpected announcements of the early 1990s related to property devaluations 
and the failure of the banks to recognize that they were grossly underprovided in 
respect of bad debts. NAB’s unexpected announcement of 2002 related to its 
Homeside mortgage division, and the 2004 announcement related to the foreign 
currency trading losses already mentioned. In each of these cases, announcements of 
losses were followed by annual reports whose profit figures were dramatically 
affected. The figures in Table 1 are taken from the banks’ annual reports rather than 
from earlier announcements of the extent of losses, underprovisions or writedowns.  
In the early 1990s, all of Australia’s big four banks experienced problems with bad 
and doubtful debt provisions, particularly ANZ, CBA and WBC. ANZ reported a 
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profit of $267m in 1991 after a charge for bad and doubtful debts of $1,037m. The 
following year, in 1992, ANZ reported a loss of $579m (ANZ, 1992, p. 34; Lloyd, 
1992, p. 37; Kaye, 1992, p. 28), due to massive bad and doubtful debt provisions of 
$1,600m. In the 1992 Report to Shareholders, the provisioning charge was attributed 
to the “worst recession since the 1930s” in Australia (ANZ, 1992, p. 15), resulting in 
a devaluation of properties, particularly in Victoria, which was severely affected 
(ANZ, 1992, pp.  9 and 10). This charge was expected to be reduced in the years 
ahead, assisting the bank to return to profitability (ANZ, 1992, p. 8).  
In 1991, CBA (1995, p. 34) declared a profit of $883m, after a provision for bad and 
doubtful debts of $1,026m. The following year, in 1992, the bank’s bad debt problems 
were not over (Willmer, 1992), with the bad and doubtful debts charge remaining 
high at $843m. In 1992, the profit of $409m was less than half that of 1991 (CBA, 
1995, p. 34). 1992 was described in CBA’s annual report as a “difficult year during 
which economic activity remained weak” (CBA, 1992, p. 40).  
WBC also struggled at that time with its bad and doubtful debt provisions. A profit of 
$476m in 1991 was earned after making provisions of $1,119m, and in 1992 the 
situation worsened, with a bad and doubtful debt provision of $2,802m, resulting in a 
loss of $1,562. (WBC, 1992, p. 38). The 1992 expense included new specific 
provisions relating to “diminutions in value of property development projects” (WBC, 
1992, p. 55), brought about by changing valuation policy to current market value 
(WBC, 1992, p. 42) because of a disastrous fall in the property market. This led to a 
WBC write-down of property by 34% (Kavanagh, 1992, p. 18, WBC, 1992, p. 12).  
NAB’s 2001 annual report reflected the result of the collapse of its United States 
subsidiary, HomeSide, as a result of what was “arguably Australia’s biggest corporate 
blunder” of that year (Durie, 2002, p. 72). The bank’s group net profit (after tax) 
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attributable to members of the company was $2,083m after “writedowns of mortgage 
servicing rights and goodwill” in HomeSide Lending, Inc., after tax, of $3,617m had 
been taken into account (NAB, 2001, p. 10). Despite the unexpectedness of the 
HomeSide announcements of July and September 2001, and the size of the loss, NAB 
was not punished by the market, with its share price increasing 47% by June 2002 
(Durie, 2002, p. 72).  
In December 2003 the NAB group reported a profit after tax of $3,955m (NAB, 2003, 
p. 82), and the next month, unexpectedly, it announced estimated foreign currency 
trading losses of $180m, which eventually grew to a staggering $360m. They were 
incurred as a result of the illegal practices of several “rogue” foreign currency traders 
who, since 2001, had been taking advantage of the banks’ lack of internal controls 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004, p. 7; APRA, 2004). Rather than being revealed 
through the bank’s own internal control systems, these revelations came about as a 
result of information about “suspicious behaviour” provided by one NAB “whistle-
blower” (ABC, 2004; Hepworth, 2004, p. 4).   
In an economy where the banking sector is dominated by its major banks to the extent 
of 70% of Australian banking business, these unexpected revelations had a significant 
effect on public perceptions about the image of NAB and other banks. However, such 
is the trust of the Australian public in the big banks as investment vehicles, and in the 
regulatory system’s ability to respond to crises, that invariably, they survive 
revelations of an unexpected nature, even if these revelations are massive in size and 
effect.  
Immediately following NAB’s shock announcement, several inquiries were launched. 
In 2001, the Australia Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) had identified 
Australia as non-compliant with effective banking supervision requirements, and its 
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inquiry into NAB’s foreign currency trading losses represented not just an 
investigation into the bank’s practices, but also an attempt to safeguard its own 
reputation as the watchdog of the Australian financial industry. It required NAB to 
implement changes to its control systems (APRA, 2004, pp. 78–79; Murray 2004b, p. 
27; Anonymous, 2004, p. 78), further damaging its reputation and integrity (Cornell, 
2004, p. 55).  
NAB conducted its own investigation in order to determine how the losses occurred, 
their extent, and also to re-establish its image, which had been considerably tarnished. 
Criticism of its board was harsh, with “an unsuspected degree of sloppiness in the 
bank’s risk management” being uncovered (Sykes, 2004, p. 9), deficiencies in 
governance, an aggressive risk-taking culture (APRA, 2004, p. 72, Hewson, 2004, p. 
82) and a poor level of transparency (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2004, p. 32). NAB 
responded with the resignation of several directors, including the Managing Director 
and CEO, Frank Cicutto, who had survived NAB’s 2002 HomeSide crisis. In addition, 
auditing systems, found to be seriously deficient (Durie, 2004, p. 84) were reviewed, 
control procedures were strengthened, and several individuals were dismissed (NAB 
Group, 2004). NAB’s foreign currency crisis and its aftermath highlighted the foreign 
currency trading culture of all major Australian banks (Baker, 2004, p. 55), and 
challenged them to review their governance systems (Whyte and Boyd, 2004, p. 64).  
These five unanticipated banking announcements can be viewed as part of a cycle of 
boom and bust, but they should also be set into their regulatory context. The next 
section explores this from an institutional perspective.    
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3. An institutional regulatory framework 
Financial reports are presented as objectively constructed images of reality, but in 
many cases, these images are shown subsequently to have been flawed, and extremely 
subjective. Corporate crises raise the issue of what trust can be placed in financial 
reports, and how they are to be interpreted. Clarke et al. (2003, p. 241) asserted that 
financial reports prepared in compliance with accounting standards are unreliable and 
extremely subjective, failing to provide any “real world manifestation”. Entities, 
however, do not prepare financial reports according to their own rules, but within the 
context of an institutional framework, which includes a system of financial reporting 
rules. Recognising these institutional dynamics, neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983) suggests that organizations, eager to appear legitimate, are subject 
to three kinds of institutional pressures, from regulatory authorities (“regulatory” 
pressure), from the taken-for-granted (“normative”) expectations of society, and from 
the pressure of copying successful organizations (“mimetic” pressure).   
In the creation of financial reports within the boundaries of regulations, Hines (1988, 
p. 257) observed that financial reports, rather than merely “communicating” reality, 
actually construct it, i.e. that financial reporting is not a technical activity but rather a 
manifestation of the power of financial statements to create a subjective reality.  This 
is consistent with Clarke et al.’s (2003) belief, already highlighted, that there is no 
correspondence between financial reports and the events or financial positions they 
portray. Accountants are not usually perceived to be creative, imaginative people who 
wrestle with ontological issues, such as what constitutes reality and consequent 
epistemological issues such as how knowledge can be apprehended. However, the 
conflicting beliefs about financial statements that have been outlined indicate that 
people have different understandings about what reality is, and how knowledge is 
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defined and communicated. While financial statements are portrayed as factual, 
objective and irrefutable, beneath those statements lie deeply held philosophical 
assumptions and ideologies.  
Rejecting the notion that financial statements actually “construct” reality, Mouck 
(2004) drew on Searle’s (1995) theory of institutional reality. He likened the 
establishment of acceptable forms of financial regulation, including financial 
reporting, to the rules of a game, which, once set in place, become the framework by 
which the game is governed. The “game” of financial reporting, therefore, is played 
by companies, which apply these rules to their own financial operations, and produce 
reports which portray a particular view of “reality”. These reports, while they are 
“epistemologically objective with respect to those rules”, are the product of a system 
which in itself has no objective basis (Mouck, 2004, p. 540).  This can be described, 
as shown in Table 2, as a three-tiered system: an institutional framework exists which 
is realist and objective, consisting of  taken-for-granted societal expectations. Within 
that framework, a system of financial reporting rules and regulations is subjectively 
created, with which entities must comply. As entities apply the rules and regulations, 
their financial reports, while reflecting the necessity of measuring up favourably 
against those of their competitors, are nevertheless perceived to be objectively 
constructed. Somewhere in the process, however, reality has been re-defined and what 
lies beneath the figures has been submerged.    
[Insert Table 2] 
The next section sets the institutional context in which Australian banks operate by 
providing an historical overview of three banking inquiries, and a broad overview of 
Australian financial reporting rules and regulations. These institutionalised systems 
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assist the banks in their pursuit of legitimacy as they are able to demonstrate 
conformity with societal expectations. 
4. Historical background 
4.1 Banking Inquiries 
Three major government inquiries into banking were conducted in Australia between 
1981 and 1996. They provided legitimacy for both the governments and the banks; for 
governments because the very institution of an inquiry demonstrated a commitment to 
accountability and public interest issues, and for the banks because the regulations 
that followed provided them with an opportunity for improved financial reporting.      
4.1.1 Campbell Report. 
The establishment of the Napier Royal Commission by the Commonwealth 
Government in 1935, to inquire into Australia’s monetary and banking system, 
reflected a realization, after the experience of the Great Depression of the early 1930s, 
that development in financial markets could severely affect general economic 
conditions (Australian Government, 1997, p. 575). Between the Napier Royal 
Commission into the Monetary and Banking System in 1937, and the institution of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia in 19601, changes to Australian banking arrangements 
were incremental, reflecting response to consumer demand.  
In establishing a Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System (the 
Campbell Committee, chaired by Sir Keith Campbell) in 1979, the then Federal 
Treasurer, John Howard, recognized that since the Royal Commission there had been 
“massive change in both the domestic and international financial environment”, and 
furthermore, that it was essential that the structure and operations of the Australian 
                                                 
1 This occurred as a result of the Banking Act of 1959, when the new Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
took over the central bank responsibility previously held by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. 
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financial system should “adequately meet the current and future needs of the 
Australian economy”. The purpose was not more regulation, but an assessment of the 
current levels of regulation and government involvement (De Lucia and Peters, 1998, 
p. 3). 
The overriding theme of the Campbell Report, published in 1981, was that “the 
community would be best served by a deregulated financial system”, i.e. one “subject 
to the discipline of the market with a minimum of government intervention and 
regulation” (De Lucia and Peters, 1993, p. 3). While the report was concerned with 
financial stability and the need for prudential oversight, it was the theme of 
deregulation which attracted the most attention and provided the impetus for later 
changes in Australia’s financial systems (Weerasooria, 2000, p. 12). The report’s 
findings included: 
• market oriented intervention by the authorities is preferable on 
efficiency grounds to direct controls because it influences demand, 
supply and the cost of credit across the entire spectrum of the financial 
system; 
• regulations imposed on the financial system should not be 
concentrated on particular types of institutions, but rather should apply 
equally to all institutions; 
• there should be no legislative or administrative barriers to entry into 
the various forms of financial intermediation, and 
• governments have a responsibility to ensure the stability and 
confidence of the financial system through the use of prudential 
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guidelines on the operations of financial institutions (De Lucia and 
Peters, 1993, p. 3). 
4.1.2 Martin Report  
With the change of government in 1983, the Australian banking system experienced 
another series of profound changes. At a time when the world economy was unstable, 
inflation was high and having an adverse effect on investments, and financial markets 
were competing globally with the advent of new technology, Australian monetary 
authorities adopted more liberal marketing policies and the Commonwealth 
Government made the decision to “float” the Australian dollar (De Lucia and Peters, 
2003, p. 1). This action was taken as a result of the report of the Martin Committee, 
whose appointment was announced on the election of a new Labor Government in 
1983, by the Federal Treasurer, Mr. Paul Keating. Its purpose was to “report on the 
financial system … (with) regard to the Campbell Committee recommendations and 
(taking) account of the Government’s economic and social objectives as well as of the 
need to improve the efficiency of the financial system” (De Lucia and Peters, 2003, p. 
4).   
In the tradition of the Campbell Report, the Martin Report recommended continued 
deregulation and the introduction of more “market oriented” policies, including the 
introduction of international banks into the Australian market, and the floating of the 
Australian dollar, already mentioned (De Lucia and Peters, 2003, p. 4). The Report 
also recommended the introduction of prudential provisions to ensure “stability of the 
financial system” (De Lucia and Peters, 1998, p. 5) and the “maintenance of 
community confidence” (Moore et al., 1992, p. 172). These recommendations were 
taken up with the Government’s introduction of prudential guidelines for banks.  
 14
There was thus a recognition that a sound institutional system was necessary for the 
effective functioning of Australia’s financial industry. 
4.1.3 Wallis report  
In the wake of the Martin Report, the increased competition within the banking sector, 
together with technological advances and innovative product design and distribution 
modes, led to the “increasing commoditisation of financial products” (De Lucia and 
Peters, 1998, p. 9). In June 1996, the Federal Treasurer, Mr Peter Costello, announced 
a new Financial System inquiry whose terms of reference were:  
… providing a stocktake of the results arising from deregulation of the 
Australian financial system since the early 1980s. The forces driving 
further change will be analysed, in particular, technological development. 
Recommendations will be made on the nature of the regulatory 
arrangements that will best ensure an efficient, responsible, competitive 
and flexibile financial system to underpin stronger economic performance, 
consistent with financial stability, prudence, integrity and fairness (Crane 
et al., 2001, pp. 102 – 103). 
Specifically, the inquiry, to be chaired by Mr Stan Wallis, was to report on the results 
of deregulation that followed the Campbell Report, identify factors that would 
contribute to future change and make recommendations on Australia’s financial 
regulatory structures (De Lucia and Peters, 1998, pp. 3–4). While the inquiry was not 
a response to a specific financial crisis, it lent credibility to the government’s image as 
good economic managers, concerned with what Australian’s financial system  would 
look like in 2010, and how it could operate as “a world’s best financial system” (De 
Lucia and Peters, 2003, p. 7). In attempting to predict what Australia’s financial 
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system would look like in 2010, two extremities of views were identified: one that 
change would be “gradual and incremental” and at the other extreme, that the 
financial system was experiencing a “paradigm shift”. The Inquiry predicted 
“considerable change” would occur over the medium term (Australian Government, 
1997, pp. 11–12).  
The findings of the Wallis Inquiry were released in April, 1997, and included 115 
recommendations. They reflected the necessity of balancing prudential regulatory 
requirements against the need for the financial system to be capable of responding in a 
flexible and efficient manner to increased competition, both domestic and 
international. There were four primary areas of investigation, competition and 
efficiency, conduct and disclosure, financial safety, and systemic stability and 
payments, all of which relate to the broad institutional framework as portrayed in 
Table 2.  
Integrity was identified as a core value of financial markets, together with the need for 
adequate disclosure to protect consumers and enable informed judgements to be 
made. To this end, the Report recommended a regulatory structure consisting of three 
distinct regulators, each with specific areas of responsibility and accountability, in 
order to foster competition and growth within financial system markets, while at the 
same time ensuring safety and protection for consumers.  Thus, from broad notions 
relating ot the institutional framework, actual mechanisms were suggested, as 
reflected in the second level of Table 2. 
A Payments System Board (PSB) was to be established as part of the RBA, with 
oversight responsibility of the Australian payments system. This would allow the 
main board of the RBA to attend to monetary policy and issues of economic stability.  
The Australian Prudential Regulation Commission (APRC) was to be established as a 
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single prudential regulator, combining the existing regulatory responsibility of the 
RBA, the Financial Institutions Scheme and the Investments and Securities 
Commission (ISC). By separating the functions of the RBA and the APRC, each 
regulator would be able to focus on their main areas of responsibility within their 
portfolio, and clearer lines of accountability would further encourage competition and 
ensure safety. The Corporations and Financial Services Commission (CFSC) was 
proposed to take over the responsibilities of the Australian Consumer and 
Competition Commission (ACCC), regulating conduct and disclosure that would 
benefit the consumer within the financial system markets. However, not all the 
recommendations were incorporated into formal rules and regulations as had been 
proposed in the Wallis Report.  
4.2 Financial accounting rules and regulations 
The regulatory system in which Australia banks produce financial statements has 
developed against the backdrop of these banking inquiries and the broad institutional 
structures that have been socially constructed as a result (Mouck, 2004).  Once these 
systems and regulatory bodies are in place, the rules and regulations they develop and 
enforce appear objective, with entities’ compliance judged against them.  Regulations 
emanating from the Corporations Act 2001 (2001), and from various regulatory 
bodies formed as a result of legislation, such as the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), APRA and the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), have been tightened in recent years. More 
demanding rules in relation to corporate disclosure (Kavanagh, 2003, p. 12) and 
governance have been stimulated by institutional pressures from the public for 
corporate boards to demonstrate greater accountability for their operating systems. By 
complying with these expectations, banks are able to present a legitimate image, both 
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in matters of governance and profit-making. In the face of crises, banks and all 
companies invariably rely on promoting themselves in a positive light.  
5. Bank responses  
Competition between the four major banks is intense, and banks must conform to 
societal expectations by producing financial reports that comply with regulatory 
requirements and thus present a favourable image. The unexpected announcements 
already highlighted illustrate that adherence to financial reporting regulations is not 
sufficient to ensure good results. According to Table 2, while the quantification of 
accounting rules and regulations seems objective, it occurs within a system that is 
epistemically subjectively created. The institutional framework, while accepted as a 
“given”, cannot be taken as objective, and consequently, if users of annual reports are 
to have confidence in them, more information is required than that demanded by 
accounting standards and Corporations Law. Users need to have confidence in the 
broad institutional framework, and in the process through which reports are prepared. 
In recent years there has been an increasing emphasis on good corporate governance, 
i.e. the development of good institutional systems from which rules and regulations 
emanate.   
In March 2003, the ASX Corporate Governance Council released its “Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations” (ASX 2003), in 
which it outlined ten principles and 28 recommendations, intended to provide a guide 
for listed companies. In relation to financial reporting and the management of risk, 
these recommendations include adherence to accounting standards, the establishment 
of an audit committee, and the development and implementation of an official policy 
to recognise and manage risk (ASX, 2003).  Compliance with these principles is not 
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mandatory, but companies are required to disclose the extent to which they have 
adopted the ASX’s corporate governance recommendations (ASX 2005).  
As a result of these recommendations, annual reports now contain more than financial 
information, and all Australian listed companies are aware of the importance of 
compliance with corporate governance expectations in presenting a reliable, 
successful image. NAB’s foreign currency loss disclosures of 2004 would appear to 
have had an impact on all major banks, particularly NAB and CBA. A study of the 
annual reports of all four major banks for 2003 and 2004 reveals changes, some 
significant, in the extent to which banks complied with ASX corporate governance 
recommendations.  
The 2003 ANZ report (ANZ, 2003, p. 39) stated full compliance with ASX Corporate 
Governance recommendations, as did its 2004 report (ANZ, 2004, p. 45). WBC’s 
report changed slightly between 2003 and 2004. In 2003, it noted a failure to comply 
with the ASX recommendation relating to shareholder approval of equity-based 
executive remuneration (WBC, 2003, pp. 66–67), while in 2004, this was presented as 
“qualified compliance” (WBC, 2004, pp. 68–69). The 2003 CBA report did not 
mention the ASX principles of good corporate governance (CBA, 2003), while in 
2004, it stated that it had fully complied with all recommendations (CBA, 2004, p. 
39).  
NAB’s 2003 report also did not mention the ASX corporate governance guidelines, 
but after the events of 2004, its annual report identified five instances of non-
compliance (NAB, 2004, p. 78). The 2004 report placed greater emphasis on the 
Directors’ report, the Financial Review and Corporate Governance sections. These all 
portrayed a company shocked by the foreign currency revelations, and working to 
rectify the systems that allowed the losses to occur. NAB’s 2004 Directors’ Report 
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included the statement that “no further matter, item, transaction or event of a material 
and unusual nature has arisen in the interval between end of financial year and date of 
report that in the opinion of the directors has significantly affected or may 
significantly affect the operations of the group, the results of those operations or the 
state of affairs of the group in future financial years” (NAB, 2004, p. 87). The 
Directors’ Report (NAB, 2004, pp. 84-85), under the heading “significant changes in 
the state of affairs”, also included a lengthy discussion of the foreign exchange trading 
losses of $360m, citing the PricewaterhouseCoopers Report of March 12, 2004: “the 
losses arising from the foreign currency options trading increased significantly 
between September 2003 and January 2004”, with four traders exploiting “loopholes 
and weaknesses in systems and processes to hide trading losses and protect bonuses”.  
Further, the company admitted that “warning signals, both inside the Company and 
from the regulators and other market participants, were not properly acted upon” 
(NAB, 2004, p. 64), in spite of the fact that the Board had “overall responsibility for 
corporate governance, including safeguarding stakeholder interests and reviewing and 
monitoring risk management and compliance” (NAB, 2004, p. 85). The company 
indicated changes it had made in its board, management, risk and control frameworks, 
and culture, including information on the company’s  “whistleblower protection 
program” (NAB, 2004, p. 79), which, significantly, was also included in the 2003 
report (NAB, 2003, p. 69).  
The response by the banks indicated a desire to present themselves as institutionally 
acceptable. Given the competition between the four major banks, it is hardly 
surprising that they would present an image of conformity with regulatory 
requirements. It would be expected that all the banks, not just NAB, would have 
conducted substantial internal reviews of the policies and procedures regarding risk 
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management and ethical behaviour as a result of all financial controversies, 
particularly after that of January 2004, given the scope of the APRA investigation2, 
which focused on the foreign exchange options trading practices of all the major 
banks. While APRA uncovered some risk management control issues, there were 
none of the “same magnitude” of those at NAB (Murray 2004a, p. 47; AAP, 2004). 
There is no doubt that risk management moved “up the agenda” of boards, but a 
survey3 suggested this was because of increased regulatory requirements rather than 
self-assessment (Murray 2004a, p. 47). For whatever the reason the profile of risk 
management increased internally, it is hardly surprising that the banks’ desire to 
present themselves as sound in these areas would be reflected in their 2004 annual 
reports.  
By reporting on their compliance with the ASX corporate governance 
recommendations, the banks demonstrated the reliability of their systems. From an 
institutional viewpoint, both the regulatory authorities (ASIC, ASX, APRA) and the 
regulated (the banks), by promulgating and adhering to rules and regulations, 
demonstrate their legitimacy. The speed and effectiveness of the reactions of 
regulators and law enforcement agencies are scrutinised in an institutional 
environment where there are greatly increased “political, public, industry and business 
expectations” that misconduct on the part of companies will be prevented, minimised, 
and punished (Lucy, 2004, p. 6).  
                                                 
2 When it announced in March 2004 that it had completed its investigation of NAB, APRA also 
announced that it was in the process of reviewing the “risk management practices” of other authorised 
deposit taking institutions, asking them “to satisfy themselves and APRA that they could not face 
similar problem” (APRA, 2004).  
3 PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Economist Intelligence Unit surveyed 130 executives of “global 
financial institutions”, with regulatory pressure being identified by almost three-quarters of them as an 
“extremely significant” or “major” driver of changes in risk management priorities over the last two 
years (Murray 2004a: 47).  
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6. Conclusions 
This paper has presented an institutional perspective of the “boom and bust” cycles of 
Australian banking, with particular focus on unexpected financial losses announced 
by the four major banks over the past fifteen years. These losses were unexpected, 
with no hint being given in earlier reports that there was any trouble looming. 
Financial reporting rules and regulations, while they are portrayed as being objective, 
are only objective if the institutional context in which they are applied is taken as 
given. The institutional systems which underlie these rules and regulations are, 
however, subjectively determined. Three major banking inquiries were all 
subjectively and politically motivated, but the recommendations for regulatory reform 
were not implemented completely. Within this context, the controversies examined in 
this paper were unable to be prevented. Thus, rather than being objective, financial 
reporting rules and regulations ultimately operate within a broader institutional 
context, which is subjectively determined. Increasingly, there is a need for banks to 
provide evidence that they have sound corporate governance practices underlying the 
reports they produce if they are to maintain an image of legitimacy. In the light of 
banking revelations over the last fifteen years, this boom and bust history, users of 
financial reports are demanding even greater disclosure, and require more assurance 
that they can rely on the reality behind the figures.  
This paper has focused on the revelations of four banks, over a fifteen year period. A 
longer period of study, or a wider focus that included other banks and financial 
institutions, may provide further evidence, not only of the cyclical nature of financial 
crises and consequent recovery, but also of the integrity of an institutional approach, 
which focuses on the legitimising power of regulatory systems. While institutional 
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theory does offer particular insights, it also dictates the focus, and, as with the 
employment of any theory, thereby determines the interpretation of data.  
Given the banks’ history of financial crises, there seems no doubt that, paradoxically, 
further unexpected announcements may be expected. When each new crisis unfolds 
the public will demand increased assurance that they can rely on the banks’ financial 
reports. As in the past, it is expected that the regulatory authorities, by providing an 
acceptable institutional framework, will assist the banks in repairing their image and 
re-establishing their legitimacy.   
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Table 1 
Selected unexpected banking expenses or losses 
 
Year Bank Significant 
expenses/losses 
$m 
Net profit for the 
year (after tax) 
attributable to 
shareholders 
$m 
Nature of significant 
expense 
1991 ANZ 1,037 267 Provision for Bad and 
Doubtful Debts 
1992 ANZ 1,600 (579) Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts 
1991 CBA 1,026 883 Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts 
1992 CBA    843 409 Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts 
1991 WBC 1,119 476 Provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts 
(Sources: ANZ 1992, CBA 1995, NAB 2001, NAB 2004, WBC 1992) 
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Table 2  
An institutional regulatory framework (based on Mouck, 2004) 
 
Operational 
level  
Level of 
objectivity 
Explanation Institutional 
Theory  
Examples 
Institutional 
framework 
Realist, objective 
if the institutional 
framework is 
taken as “given” 
“interlocking set 
of status 
functions” (p. 
533) 
Normative 
(taken-for-
granted) 
institutional 
pressures 
Governments, 
legal systems, 
money, 
corporations, 
the notion of 
accountability 
Financial 
accounting 
rules and 
regulations 
Epistemically 
subjective (p. 
540) 
Subjectively 
constructed, but 
once set, these 
“rules of the 
game” become 
concrete and 
objective 
Regulatory/ 
coercive 
institutional 
pressures 
Corporations 
Law, 
accounting and 
auditing 
standards 
Quantification 
of accounting 
rules and 
regulations 
Epistemically 
objective (p. 540) 
Many of the 
elements of 
financial 
statements are 
“epistemologicall
y objective facts”, 
even though they 
have an 
“ontologically 
subjective mode 
of existence” 
Mimetic 
institutional 
pressures (image 
creation to 
preserve 
organizational 
legitimacy 
through 
acceptable 
results) 
Historical costs, 
market values, 
aggregations of 
different 
measurement 
models 
 
 
 
 
